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Abstract 
This article attempts to explore the extent of application of China’s policy of non-interference. It compares the 
application of this policy on some selected African states and attempts to find out whether or not the adopted 
long term policy and visible shifts can be good for China or Africa as she experiences increased interactions with 
specific African states on eco-socio-political fronts. By use of qualitative design, the authors extensively relied 
on written material in this discourse as a way of arriving at intelligible conclusions as to whether the policy will 
also enhance African peace. 
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1.  Background 
The policy of non-interference has been applied by many states in international relations. It is derived from the 
Westphalia treaty of 1648 and the United Nations stipulations which advance on equality of states. The policy 
has been a pillar on issues of state sovereignty. China’s relations with African nations, has largely been guided 
by its traditional policy of non-interference in other countries internal affairs. The policy is part of China’s Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence with other nations and has therefore guided China’s foreign policy in the 
developing world since 1950s.1 The policy of non-interference limits China’s engagement in domestic affairs of 
African countries. For this reason, China initially opposed the International Community’s intervention in African 
conflicts especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. However recently, China has increasingly supported 
intervention rather than non interference. China has provided support to the UN led missions in resolving 
conflicts in Africa. In particular, China provided support to the UN Security Council led mission in Liberia by 
sending 1300 troops in 2007. Interestingly, China was the first country to push the UN Security Council to 
intervene in Somali conflict during the 2006 UN Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa. 
China has increasingly supported Africa Regional organizations in their peacekeeping missions. This has been 
demonstrated through China’s large contribution of U.N peacekeepers to Africa in the recent years. China’s 
contribution of soldiers to UN peacekeeping in Africa, for instance has increased tenfold since 2001. By May 
2007, China had contributed 1800 peacekeeping troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa. At the moment, 
China has the largest of its peacekeepers among the five Permanent members of the UN mission to Africa.2 
Other areas of Chinese involvement include logistical support to the Regional bodies, financial assistance as well 
as providing relevant training to the African Union Peace and Security Council.3 In 2011, Kenya sent its military 
troops to join AMISOM mission in Somalia and urged the Chinese government to give support to the AMISOM 
fight against the Al-Shabaab terrorist group that has links with Al Qaida.4  
 
2.  Objective Outlined 
The paper seeks to address the reasons behind China’s increased involvement in Africa peacekeeping operations 
in conflict stricken regions.  
 
3.  Problem Stated 
Although western states, with interest in Africa in the past have taken ‘an ever-present’ player approach, China 
has however tried to maintain “non-interference” regime in her interventions in the continents’ conflicts. 
Whether this stems as their long time foreign policy is something worth probing and similarly if it is a negation 
of the western states policy in Africa is another interesting line of thought that this paper builds arguments 
around using the realism school of thought. The paper attempts to explain China’s policy shift from non- 
interference to intervention in African conflicts 
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4. Theoretical Assertions 
The scope of the study is grounded in the field of International Relations. China’s intervention in Africa crises 
can be well explained from a Realist perspective in international relations. Han Morgenthau, the great proponent 
of Political Realism stated that the main aim of states within the international system is the pursuit of their 
national interest, which is defined in terms of power.1 Therefore, the structure of the international system has 
made states to be inherently self-interested entities with an intention of building power in order to gain and 
maintain an advantage in terms of balance of power. 
Morgenthau also argued that national interest is defined within the political and cultural context of the foreign 
policy formulation.2 He also posits that the definition of power and the way it is used depends on the current 
political and cultural setting.3 Hence, China’s foreign policy and its external behaviuor can be interpreted as 
response to the changing dynamics of the international environment.4 For instance, energy security has gained 
significance as an important objective for powerful states. China as one of the great powers prioritizes security 
relations with export countries for the continuity of the energy trade relations.5  
Furthermore, Realists argue that for states to be politically successful no action should be taken in the name of 
morality.6 Hence, the survival of the state is the most important foreign policy objective for the state in the 
international system.7 Therefore, a state’s behavior is motivated by the desire to attain this goal and not morality. 
Realists affirm that states are the most important actors in the international system. However, a realist works 
with non-state actors in order to take advantage of the platform afforded by the international organization in 
order to enhance their international standing. This also enables exploitation of any opportunities in order to gain 
from the international stage.8   
We contend in this paper that China’s contribution in solving conflicts in Africa stricken regions through 
logistical and financial support and contribution of Peacekeepers in the UN is not motivated by the desire to 
become politically and economically integrated, but rather the desire to become diplomatically and economically 
stronger. Therefore, realism is a useful tool in explaining China’s foreign policy behavior towards Africa. The 
realist moral pessimism and self-interest as driving forces for a state’s foreign policy helps one to understand 
why China’s foreign policy behavior has been termed as self-serving and ruthless.9 The weakness of realism is 
…… 
5.  Research Methods  
We selected three countries as case studies in order to understand Chinese motivation for increased involvement 
in African peace and security affairs. We hope that China’s involvement in the selected countries will shed light 
on her position in Africa conflicts. This paper considers Sudan and South Sudan as one case study due to the 
inter-linkage between the two countries which were one, until 2011 when it split to become two separate 
countries. Another country of focus is Mali where China was among the countries that responded to the March 
2012 crisis, which led to the overthrowing of the government by a coup. ECOWAS regional body led the 
negotiations in order to end the conflict.10China provided financial and logistical support the ECOWAS led 
mediation. It is worth to note that China was part of the UN Security Council’s resolution responsible for making 
preparations for the interventions against the Islamic insurgents in Mali.11 
The rationale for the selection of the case studies is the fact that these countries were affected by internal 
conflicts that drew international condemnation by the international community. China has economically invested 
in these regions and has actively been involved in resolving the conflicts. Although the conflicts have ended in 
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6.  Case Presentations, Analysis, Interpretation and Findings 
6.1  China’s involvement in Sudan  
China suffered heavy criticism internationally and especially in Africa for backing the Sudanese government 
through economic investment in the country and blocking UN imposed sanctions. China propped up the regime 
of President Al Bashir by opposing the sanctions that would have pressurized the Sudanese government to stop 
the killings in Darfur. In addition, China remains the largest oil investor in both Sudan and South Sudan. The 
western media claimed that China investment in the oil sector was hindering the Security Council from halting 
the gross human rights violations in Darfur.1 International Non-Governmental Organizations for instance, the 
Human Rights Watch Report of 2003 heavily criticized China for backing the Al-Bashir regime.2 
China’s interests in Sudan tainted her image within Africa and globally portraying her as stumbling block to the 
reversal of the situation in Darfur. This led International Non-Governmental Organizations and United States 
Hollywood celebrities to campaign against Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympics calling it ”genocide Olympics” 
due to China’s economic relations with the Sudan.3 This had a negative impact on China’s image, Africa 
relations with China and globally.   
Some African leaders grew impatient with the Sudan government for gross human rights violation, religious and 
racial discrimination and they found China’s presence in Sudan as an obstacle to AU’s role of solving the 
conflict in Darfur. 4  The criticism from the African leaders threatened China’s image and relations in the 
continent.5 This partly prompted the kidnapping of Chinese citizens in the region. For instance in 2008, Sudanese 
rebels from ‘Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) raided a Chinese owned oil field in Darfur and kidnapped 
nine Chinese workers. Out of the nine workers, five were murdered and four were rescued.6 Another rebel group 
referred to as Liberation Movement–unity faction suggested that the arrival of Chinese companies would be 
considered as “Military targets.”7 
China thus changed the initially held, non- intervention strategy and applied diplomatic approach to convince Al 
Bashir government to accept the UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur. Besides, China urged the Sudan government 
to change the humanitarian situation in the region. China’s commitment was illustrated when it appointed a 
special envoy Liu Gujin to Sudan and later followed by Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Sudan in February 
2007.8 Concerning Darfur crisis, Liu argued that China played a critical role that of a bridge that eventually led 
the Sudanese government to consent the deployment of the AU/UN peacekeepers to Darfur.9 For this role, China 
received a lot of praise from the United States. This was witnessed in the G8 Summit of 2007 where former 
president Bush applauded Chinese president Hu Jintao for the positive role China played in resolving of Darfur 
turmoil. 10 
6.2  China’s Intervention in South Sudan 
China’s diplomatic role in South Sudan was significant for the North and South to reach a consensus regarding 
the oil dispute. China played a significant role in settling the conflict that existed between Sudan and South 
Sudan regarding border disagreement. China being the largest oil investor in Sudan had the ability to influence 
both countries to reach a consensus. Further, China close relations with the North influenced the peace 
agreement that was reached recently.  
The existing conflict between the two countries however presented a daunting task for China to change its 
traditional policy of non-interference with the domestic affairs of other countries. Besides, the conflicts had a 
                                                          
1
 He Wenping, “The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy,” China security, Vo. 3 No. 3. (Summer 2007), p. 34. 
2
 Human Rights Watch, 2003 Report, “Sudan and Oil,” [Available online] 
www.hrw.org/reports/2003/Sudan 1103/21.21.html#_toc54492700>, 
3
 Nicholas D. Kristof ,”China’s Genocide Olympics,” The New York Times, January 24, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/opinion/24kristof.html  accessed in March 8, 2012. 
Ian Greenberg,” Changing the Rules of the Games,” The New York Times, March 30,2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/magazine/30olympics-t.html?pagewanted=all 
Accessed in March 8, 2012. 
4
 Bates & Huang, “Assessing China's Growing Influence in Africa,” p. 13. 
5
 Yinhong Shi  “China’ peaceful development, harmonious world and international responsibility: achievements and 
challenges,” SIIS Global Review, (Spring 2008), pp 19-28. 
6
 “Rescued Workers in Sudan to return home,” Xinhua November 5, 2008, http:/www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-
11/05/content_7175495,htm accessed May 10, 2011. 
7
 “9 Chinese oil workers kidnaped in Sudan,” International Herald Tribune, October 19,2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/19/news/ML-Sudan-China-Kidnap.php .accessed in May 10, 2011. 
8
 “Hu puts forward principle on Darfur issue,” Xinhua, February 5, 2007, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-02/05/content_801432.htm accessed in March 7, 2012. 
9
 Holstag, Jonathan (2008), “China’s Diplomatic Maneuvering on the Darfur Question,” in Journal of Contemporary China, 
Vol. 17, no, 54, (2008), p 83. 
10
 “President Hu Jintao Met President Bush of US,” June 8, 
 2007. Cited in Xuefeng Sun & Feng Jin  paper on, China’s Major Approaches to Solving the Darfur Issue, (2009), p. 36. 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




negative effect on China’s economic interest in Sudan. 1  China tried to maintain a neutral position in the 
settlement of the conflict between the North and South and together with the AU playing a mediation role to 
settle the conflict by urging both countries to peacefully solve the dispute. China’s proactive involvement in 
peace brokerage was seen when it sent its special envoy Liu Guijin to both Juba and Khartoum.2  
However, Chinese involvement in the Sudan-South Sudan crisis has not been without criticism. The people of 
South Sudan including local citizens, civil society and Government officials have perceived China’s involvement 
in the Sudan and South Sudan war negatively. This is because during the war, Chinese companies continued 
giving financial support to the Khartoum government and there were claims of violent and forceful dislocation of 
the local citizens to pave way for exploration of oil by the Chinese companies.3 China’s active engagement in 
solving the dispute between the two countries was motivated by the negative criticism from the southern 
Sudanese. China’s close relations with the Khartoum government created mistrust among the southern Sudanese. 
The eruption of the conflict between the north and south presented a complex situation to China as it tried to 
balance its relations with both the Sudan and South Sudan governments.4 As the conflict between the two 
counties escalated over the oil payment row, the officials of South Sudan became increasingly disappointed with 
China’s failure to pressurize the north to lower the oil transit fee.5 
There is a general perception in the international arena that China could play a more positive role in conflict 
resolution in the region. The AU and sub- regional bodies including the people of South Sudan have been urging 
China to play a constructive role leading to the brokerage of the peace agreement between Sudan and South 
Sudan 
China’s economic interest in the region and its growing role as a responsible power has increasingly influenced 
China to proactively engage in conflict settlement a position China has progressively embraced not only in 
Sudan and South Sudan but also in other countries in Africa such as Mali. 
6.3  China’s Involvement in Mali Conflict  
The recent coup in Mali that later led to the break-away of the Tuareg region by Islamic rebels, forced western 
African countries and the international community to intervene. China supported the Malian military to fight the 
Islamist rebels,6 a role that China would normally be reluctant to be actively involved. China justified its action 
by stating that the Militia from the north are not only opposition rebel group but are also a terrorist group.7 China 
has also been actively involved in giving financial support to the ECOWAS – led peace mediation efforts. 
Further, China was part of the recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution responsible for making 
preparations for the interventions against the Islamic insurgents. China’s action of supporting ECOWAS mission 
and engagement in UN effort portrays it as a responsible global player committed to solving conflicts in Africa. 
It can be argued that China has realized that Mali crisis not only affect Mali but has the ability to affect the entire 
Sahel region thus affecting her economic interest in the region.  
 
7.  Reasons for China Shift of Non-Interference Policy 
China has justified her intervention polices by stating that with the changing situations in the international arena, 
it has been forced to actively engage in solving conflicts thereby changing its policy of non-interference. 
Furthermore, it acknowledges that with globalization, it has become difficult to differentiate what issue is 
domestic and what is global. It is argued that as a global responsible player, China is obliged to use its 
diplomatic means to resolve a rising conflict before it escalates. However, if a particular conflict aggravates, 
China supports the effort by the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations to resolve it.8 This is a position 
it was initially reluctant to be involved. Some scholars concur that Africa is the region where China 
peacekeeping is most pronounced.9 In many occasions, China has openly stated that it was willing to play a 
constructive role in settling conflicts and maintaining peace and security in Africa. The China-Africa policy 
paper of 2006 outlines several areas of cooperation that include confronting peace and security through military 
cooperation, conflict settlements and peace operations as well as judicial and peace cooperation including non-
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traditional security.1However, China normally invests in African regions which are unstable and where western 
countries tend to avoid due to the high risk involved.2 Consequently, its investments and citizens working in 
these regions are intertwined with the prevailing conflicts. 
Various factors may explain China’s shift of its non- interference policy. They include economic motivations, 
political factors, international pressure, call from Africa regional bodies and China’s concern regarding its image 
in the continent.  
7.1  Economic Reasons  
China shift of its non-interference policy has been motivated by economic interest. Conflicts in the region affect 
its economic interest. According to the standard report of 2012, China and Africa trade which stood at $166 
billion in 2011 was expected to exceed $200 billion in 2012.3Moreover, China is Africa largest trading partner 
and Africa is China’s fastest growing trade partner.4Thus, China participation in peace and security realization in 
the region is important to safeguard its investments and trade. In addition, safety of its citizens that have 
occasionally come under attacks during the past few years is a new phenomenon that would influence China’s 
political policy.  
7.2  Political Reasons 
China’s recent engagement in interventions in conflict stricken regions in Africa is not only for economic 
reasons but also political reasons. China wants to win the support of African countries to advance its interest 
globally. This is especially demonstrated in the way it votes in multilateral organizations such as the UN. Crisis 
Group Africa in its 2012 report states that China’s closeness with countries such as South Sudan is also 
motivated by diplomatic reasons as it serves political alliances for backing China’s interest in the international 
institutions.5 
7.3  International Pressure  
The international community has in many occasions called upon China to play an active role in solving conflicts 
in Africa. For instance, the international community condemned China for abstaining from voting for the 
sanctions that were meant to pressurize the Sudan government and prevent the human rights violations in Darfur 
region. Conversely, China ability to convince Sudan to accept AU/UN peacekeeping troops received 
international community commendation for this significant role.6 The Regional organizations in the continent 
have openly asked China to take an active role in helping to mediate for peace in Africa.   
7.4  Call from Africa Regional Bodies  
In many occasions, China has shifted its initially held positions to support the position held by the regional 
bodies. For instance, China’s support to deploy more peacekeepers was also rooted in the fear of being 
condemned of impeding the work of the Africa Union (AU).7AU’s ability to influence China’s position was 
exemplified when the AU representatives in the UN Security Council politically supported the AU/UN 
deployment to Darfur prompting China to change its initial position.8 Chris and Alves (2009) agree that the 
African countries have the capacity to influence China policy towards African countries with AU taking the 
leading role.9 From the beginning of the crisis in Darfur, China has been cautious not to interfere in AU effort to 
end the conflict. As demonstrated in 2004 China abstained in a UN resolution that threatened an oil sanction on 
Sudan and justified its stance of abstaining instead of vetoing in order not to interfere with AU work. AU had 
already sent 3000 troops to Darfur and needed more by Simon Freemantle and Jeremy Stevens peacekeepers to 
be deployed in the region.10 As a result of AU request, China supported the deployment of AU/UN hybrid force 
to Darfur. In addition, it gave financial contribution to the AU peacekeeping troops amounting to $3.5 million 
for humanitarian aid. Besides, China eventually sent its peacekeeping troops to the Darfur region.11  
7.5  Image Matters 
China’s proactive involvement in conflict resolution in Africa has also been motivated by its concern regarding 
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its image in the continent. China’s image has been tarnished because of its role in Sudan conflicts where China 
heavily invested in the oil sector and failed to use its position to pressurize the Sudan government to change the 
situation on the ground. Further, the South Sudan people considered China to have been siding with the Sudan 
government. This has led to a negative perception of China’s investment in the South Sudan region. Therefore, 
with the disagreement between the Sudan and South Sudan, China has diplomatically been actively involved in 
negotiating for a mutual agreement. Its special envoy Liu Gujin has visited both Khartoum and Juba urging both 
governments to reach an agreement. China has tried to maintain its neutral position to avoid criticisms from 
South Sudan. Besides, China realized that the majority of the oil was found in the south and if it does not take a 
neutral position, the criticism may affect its economic interest in the region.   
 
8.  Conclusion  
China’s actions in the Sudan, South Sudan and Mali portray a responsible player in African domestic affairs. It 
does not want to be perceived as an obstacle in the efforts made by the regional bodies in Africa to solve 
conflicts. China’s action in the Sudan- South Sudan mediation efforts to resolve the oil disagreement is a 
realisation that the conflicts will affect China’s economic interest since it had invested heavily in the region. 
Moreover, by China helping in conflicts mediation, its image that was initially negatively perceived by South 
Sudanese residents will eventually improve. As China, participates in peace keeping in the region, its image as a 
responsible global player will also be enhanced.  
It is clear that as China grows in its relevance in the global stage, its responsibilities also increase. Therefore, 
with China’s growing role especially in African peace and security, its policy of non-interference has had to 
adapt to the new changes. Similarly, China has realised that peace is important so as to ensure safety of its 
economic investments in Africa.It is worth to note that the realization of adoption of global responsible image 
implies a weakness in realism. It also implies that a global responsible image requires some application of 
security strategies  
China increasing involvement in Africa conflict resolution is a trend we are likely to see in the future. This will 
however be dependent on the Africa countries position on the matter. Therefore, with China’s growing interest in 
African peace and security, the Africa Union should therefore come up with the rules of engagement with China 
in solving conflicts in Africa. In this way, China will play a more positive role in the enhancement of peace in 
the African region  
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